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RULE 
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In Mapp v. Ohio (1961), the Warren Court held that the so-called exclusionary rule was 
applicable to the states.  Subsequent Supreme Courts have shown their disenchantment with the 
rule by seeking to curb its applicability.  Most recently, the Court has characterized the exclusionary 
rule as a “massive remedy” to be applied only as a “last resort.”  The Courts’s analytical 
framework for the last thirty-five years for cutting back the exclusionary rule was a balancing test 
which weighed the costs of suppressing reliable evidence with the benefits of deterring future police 
violations. 
This balancing has been used most recently in two Supreme Court cases, Hudson v. Michigan 
(2006) and Herring v. United States (2009).  In Herring, Justice Ginsberg’s dissent pointed 
out that there was a “more majestic conception” for the exclusionary rule due to its important role 
in preserving judicial integrity.  Judicial integrity was the original reason for adopting the 
exclusionary rule in the Supreme Court case of Weeks v. United States (1914).  The Court in 
Weeks saw the exclusionary rule as a remedy that would give meaning to the Fourth Amendment 
as well as prevent the Court from participating in an illegality by utilizing unlawfully obtained 
evidence.  Through balancing, the Court has eviscerated the relevance of judicial integrity as the 
original justification for the exclusionary rule.  This Article will demonstrate that the exclusionary 
rule is the only viable remedy to give meaning to the Fourth Amendment and  argues that the 
exclusionary rule be returned to its previous prominence by reinstating judicial integrity as its 
primary purpose. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Herring v. United States1 suggested that 
there is more to the exclusionary rule than just deterring police mis-
conduct.2  She described the exclusionary rule as an “essential aux-
iliary” to the “majestic” Fourth Amendment right.3  The remedy was 
necessary, Justice Ginsburg explained, to ensure that “the Fourth 
Amendment[’s] prohibitions are observed in fact” and “that the gov-
ernment would not profit from its lawless behavior.”4  These two 
goals—to give effect to the Fourth Amendment right and to prevent 
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 1 Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 2 Id. at 707. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the courts from serving as accomplices to unlawful behavior—reflect 
the Court’s historical interest in preserving judicial integrity.5  Joined 
by three of her colleagues, Justice Ginsburg reminded us of the im-
portance of this fundamental principle, which has largely been ig-
nored by a majority of the Court for the last fifty years.  This article 
advocates Justice Ginsburg’s vision to reinstate judicial integrity as 
one of the primary purposes of the exclusionary rule.  Doing so will 
ensure the continued viability of the Fourth Amendment and will 
prevent the reduction of this constitutional right to an “empty prom-
ise.”6 
The Court’s recent decisions in Hudson v. Michigan and Herring 
have explained that the exclusionary rule is a “massive remedy” to be 
applied only as a “last resort.”7  In order to exclude unlawfully-
obtained evidence, the benefit of “some incremental deterrent” to 
police misconduct must outweigh the “substantial social cost” of set-
ting a criminal free.8  As applied, the balancing test embodies all the 
ambiguities and subjectivity of a Rorschach test.9  Justice Brennan 
characterized it as rife with “intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces 
of partial and often inconclusive data.”10  Predictably, the exclusio-
nary rule does not fare well when these imbalanced factors are 
weighed.  Instead, the Court has used the balancing test to repeatedly 
uphold the introduction of evidence despite constitutional violations.  
As such, the only Fourth Amendment protections left are those 
anachronistic remedies announced over six decades ago in Wolf v. 
Colorado.  Despite the Roberts Court’s assurances that the exclusio-
nary rule can be ignored due to the increasing professionalism of po-
lice forces and greater availability of civil rights suits, we will show that 
the alternative remedies mentioned in Wolf have not progressed as far 
 
 5 See Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity:  A Call for Its Re-Emergence in the Adjudication of Crim-
inal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 464 (1993) (discussing two underlying goals 
of judicial integrity:  being regarded as a symbol of lawfulness and not appearing to be al-
lied with bad acts). 
 6 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Amendment without the sanction is a dead letter.”); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (explaining that fail-
ing to exclude illegally obtained evidence “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of 
words”). 
 7 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 599 (2006), quoted in Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700. 
 8 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (citations omitted).  
 9 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 358 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (using this 
analogy when referring to the balancing test associated with reasonable cause for Fourth 
Amendment search and seizures). 
 10 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 942 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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as the Roberts Court would have us believe in order to adequately 
guarantee Fourth Amendment rights. 
The true cost of the crude balancing test used to determine 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule is the damage levied upon the 
Fourth Amendment.  In failing to apply a remedy to an acknowl-
edged constitutional violation, the Court sacrifices our Fourth 
Amendment right for the sake of a criminal conviction and threatens 
the legitimacy of a just government.  As Justice Brandeis explained in 
Olmstead v. United States: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled 
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people 
by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of 
the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Gov-
ernment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a pri-
vate criminal—would bring terrible retribution.  Against that pernicious 
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.11 
Somewhere along the way, the Court has forgotten the impor-
tance of judicial integrity to the enforcement of constitutional rights 
and the legitimate costs associated with any decision that impliedly 
sanctions government misconduct.  The remedy of exclusion is not 
just about deterrence, it has also served as “a constraint on the power 
of the sovereign, not merely some of its agents.”12  Part I.A of this Ar-
ticle provides a brief history of the foundations of the exclusionary 
rule, paying particular attention to the Court’s original interest in sa-
feguarding the principles of judicial integrity.  Part I.B traces the rise 
of the deterrence rationale and the genesis of the balancing test, 
which deemphasized the majesty of the Fourth Amendment through 
the curtailment of its principal remedy, the exclusionary rule.  Part II 
will analyze the recent decisions in Herring and Hudson to highlight 
the Roberts Court’s recent efforts to curtail application of the exclu-
sionary rule.  Finally, Part III will argue that an attack upon the exclu-
sionary rule is an attack upon the Fourth Amendment right itself, as 
it stands little chance of being observed without the Supreme Court. 
 
 11 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 12 Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOCTRINE 
A.  The Initial Role of Judicial Integrity 
The Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule as a reme-
dy to a Fourth Amendment violation in Weeks v. United States.13  In 
Weeks, the Court suppressed evidence that was unlawfully obtained by 
federal officers and introduced into a federal prosecution.  By sup-
pressing unlawfully seized evidence, the Court accomplished two 
things.  First, the remedy would enable courts to fulfill their obligato-
ry duty of giving effect to the Fourth Amendment right.14  In the un-
animous opinion, Justice Day explained that without the remedy of 
suppression, “the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no 
value.”15  Weeks emphasized the “great principles” of the Constitution 
and expressed an unwillingness to sacrifice these fundamental rights 
to aid the conviction of one criminal.16  The exclusionary rule was 
thus conceived as a necessary adjunct to the Fourth Amendment 
right itself. 
Secondly, application of the exclusionary rule protected the legi-
timacy of governmental action by demonstrating that courts would 
not defer to the enforcement authorities when their convictions were 
secured by constitutional violations.  “[U]nlawful seizures,” Justice 
Day explained, “should find no sanction in the judgments of the 
courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Consti-
tution.”17  Thus, the benefits of judicial integrity were understood as 
strengthening the Fourth Amendment, while at the same time ensur-
ing that courts did not serve as accomplices to the unlawful seizure by 
sanctioning the use of illegally obtained evidence. 
Justice Holmes helped solidify these twin goals of judicial integrity 
through his majority opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 
and separate dissent in Olmstead.  In Silverthorne, Holmes established 
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine and reiterated Weeks’s em-
phasis upon exclusion as a necessary protection of the Fourth 
Amendment right.  Holmes declared that the failure to exclude the 
unlawfully obtained evidence “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a 
 
 13 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 14 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (“This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or 
not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under 
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.”). 
 15 Id. at 393. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 392. 
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form of words.”18  In his dissent in Olmstead, Holmes sympathized with 
the difficult choice facing justices to either sustain a conviction of a 
known criminal or sanction an unlawful search.  However, he empha-
sized that it is “a less evil that some criminals should escape than that 
the government should play an ignoble part.”19 
In Wolf, the Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.20  However, the application of 
the exclusionary rule was limited to federal prosecutions.  While ac-
knowledging that the exclusion of evidence may be an effective re-
medy, Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion suggested that equally 
effective methods of addressing the constitutional violations could be 
found through the “remedies of private action” and the “internal dis-
cipline of the police.”21  In dissent, Justice Murphy exposed the 
Court’s choice to defer to alternative remedies as a choice to ignore 
the unlawful conduct: “[a]lternatives are deceptive.  Their very state-
ment conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as the 
next.  In this case their statement is blinding.  For there is but one al-
ternative to the rule of exclusion.  That is no sanction at all.”22  Justice 
Murphy explained that the only truly effective remedy to a Fourth 
Amendment violation is to exclude the evidence.  The other reme-
dies were “illusory” because there was little evidence to suggest that 
they provided any positive deterrence.23  In addition, Justice Murphy 
echoed the judicial integrity concerns of Justices Day and Holmes by 
reiterating that suppression of evidence is necessary for the enforce-
ment of the Fourth Amendment and for ensuring that the Court not 
sanction “lawlessness by officers of the law,” which would have a “trag-
ic effect upon public respect for our judiciary.”24  Note that these sig-
 
 18 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
 19 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 20 The applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the states involved the issue of incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights.  Adamson v. California presented two different approaches to in-
corporation:  preferring a less subjective approach, Justice Black’s dissent advocated for a 
total incorporation of the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights and Justice Frank-
furter’s concurrence maintained selective incorporation of those Amendments necessary 
for due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.  332 U.S. 46, 63–64, 71–72 
(1947).  Justice Black’s approach has won the day, as most of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights have been applied to states.  The Eighth Amendment’s protection against exces-
sive bail, the Seventh Amendment’s right to jury trial in civil cases, the Fifth Amend-
ment’s right to indictment by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment’s protection 
against quartering of soldiers have not been applied to the states.  See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 2035 n.13 (2010). 
 21 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). 
 22 Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 23 Id. at 42. 
 24 Id. at 46. 
52 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
nificant, foundational purposes of the exclusionary rule have nothing 
to do with deterrence. 
A decade later, the majority opinion of Elkins v. United States asso-
ciated these concerns with the “imperative of judicial integrity.”25  El-
kins barred use of the so-called “silver platter” doctrine, a practice 
whereby federal prosecutors avoided the exclusionary rule remedy by 
encouraging state officers to unlawfully obtain evidence on their be-
half.  The Court emphasized the importance of preventing courts 
from serving as “accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Consti-
tution they are sworn to uphold.”26 
Just a year later, Mapp v. Ohio applied the exclusionary rule for 
Fourth Amendment violations to all state actions and prosecutions.  
The egregious Fourth Amendment violation in Mapp involved a war-
rantless search of defendant’s home that culminated in the police of-
ficers breaking the window of the back door and, once inside, ran-
sacking the house indiscriminately.  In reviewing the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s decision to sustain the conviction despite the blatant Fourth 
Amendment violations, the Court declared that “we can no longer 
permit that right to remain an empty promise.”27  Justice Clark’s ma-
jority opinion explained that the application of the exclusionary rule 
grants individuals their constitutional rights, but, more importantly 
for the courts, it declared “judicial integrity so necessary in the true 
administration of justice.”28 
Significantly, Mapp reiterated the policy first expressed in Weeks 
that the exclusionary rule was a necessary adjunct to the Fourth 
Amendment right.  In overruling Wolf, Justice Clark explained that 
the remedy was “an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment” 
and “part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation[s].”29  
 
 25 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).  But see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp 
v. Ohio and Beyond:  The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-
and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1382 n.92, 1385, 1397 (1983) (suggesting later 
that he “did not intend to imply that . . . [judicial integrity] provided a constitutional ba-
sis for the exclusionary rule.”  Instead, Stewart believed the exclusionary rule was consti-
tutionally required because without it “the fourth amendment’s prohibitions would be 
rendered ineffective.”  However, one of the twin goals of judicial integrity, as originally 
expressed in Weeks, is to fulfill the judicial obligation of supporting the Constitution.  By 
insisting that the exclusionary rule was required to give effect to the Fourth Amendment 
right, that it was part and parcel of the right itself, Justice Stewart was actually justifying 
the constitutionality of the doctrine through one of the twin goals of judicial integrity as 
originally conceived in Weeks). 
 26 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208, 223. 
 27 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 651. 
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Without the exclusionary rule, Clark continued, the Fourth Amend-
ment would be “valueless” and “so neatly severed from its conceptual 
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence 
as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.’”30 
B.  The Rise of Deterrence 
The Mapp decision represented a high water mark for the exclu-
sionary rule and the Supreme Court’s concern for judicial integrity.  
As the Court’s disenchantment with the exclusionary rule became 
more apparent, its desire to maintain judicial integrity began to re-
cede into footnotes.  Among justices interested in curtailing the re-
medy, the deterrence rationale rose in prominence.  Ultimately, a ba-
lancing test emerged listing deterrence as the sole benefit and 
highlighting the substantial social costs of exclusion, specifically the 
obstructions to conviction and suppression of reliable evidence being 
suppressed, as weighing strongly against application of the disfavored 
remedy.31 
The benefit of deterring police misconduct was not among the 
original justifications presented for the exclusionary rule in Weeks.  
Over the course of the last fifty years, however, deterrence has occu-
pied a growing centrality to the point that it is now considered the 
only benefit and purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
The language of deterrence was first mentioned in passing as a 
potentially beneficial purpose of the exclusionary rule in Wolf’s ma-
jority opinion.32  Five years later, in Irvine v. California, Justice Jackson 
suggested that the remedy provided only a “mild deterrent at best.”33  
It was not until Elkins that deterrence was established as one of the 
rule’s important goals.  Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart ex-
plained that “[i]ts purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it.”34  In the evolution of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence concerning the exclusionary rule, the specific 
holding in Elkins regarding the “silver platter” doctrine has been of 
relatively minor importance.  Yet, its language regarding deterrence 
 
 30 Id. at 655. 
 31 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984). 
 32 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (“[I]n practice the exclusion of evidence may 
be an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches.”). 
 33 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137 (1954). 
 34 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
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has become the principal citation for justices seeking to limit the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule by suggesting that the doctrine is 
aimed at accomplishing the limited policy objective of deterrence. 
Mapp followed closely on the heels of Elkins and was significant in 
two important respects beyond its landmark application of the exclu-
sionary rule to the states.  Mapp was the first case to briefly mention 
the deterrence language of Elkins, although it did so alongside its 
greater emphasis upon judicial integrity.  Mapp is also significant be-
cause it signaled the emergence of the argument, in Justice Harlan’s 
dissent, that the exclusionary rule should be limited to instances 
where it serves a deterrent effect.  Harlan emphasized that since the 
exclusionary rule “is aimed at deterring,” it should only be applied 
when it can achieve this goal, providing a first glimpse of one of the 
critical arguments in favor of curtailing the remedy.35 
Just four years later, Linkletter v. Walker was the first case to deny 
the application of the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment vi-
olation by declaring deterrence as the primary purpose of the reme-
dy.  The Court refused to apply the holding in Mapp retroactively by 
finding that suppression would fail to accomplish the only justifica-
tion for the rule, which was “based on the necessity for an effective 
deterrent to illegal police action.”36  In dissent, Justice Black found 
the narrowed emphasis upon deterrence, as opposed to the Court’s 
obligation to give effect to the right itself, “a rather startling depar-
ture from many past opinions.”37  To the extent the Court even ad-
dressed judicial integrity, it managed to obscure the concept entirely 
by suggesting that an opposite holding would cause such an adminis-
trative burden that the “integrity of the judicial process” would be 
negatively affected.38 
Following Linkletter’s lead, the Court continued to devalue the role 
of judicial integrity in United States v. Calandra, in which the Court 
held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to grand jury pro-
ceedings.  Demonstrating how far the ideal of judicial integrity had 
fallen, Justice Stewart managed only to address the consideration in a 
footnote to his majority opinion and then only to dismiss the dissent’s 
concerns by stating it would be an “unprecedented extension of the 
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings.”39  Calandra also began 
to unravel the concept that the remedy was part and parcel of the 
 
 35 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 36 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965). 
 37 Id. at 649 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 38 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 470 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1975)). 
 39 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355–56 n.11 (1974). 
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Fourth Amendment right, arguing that it was a “judicially created 
remedy” rather than a “personal constitutional right.”40 
Calandra’s historical significance is also due to the fact that it in-
troduced the now familiar balancing test to the exclusionary rule 
analysis, restricting application of the remedy to instances where the 
deterrence purpose would be “most efficaciously served,” and balanc-
ing the benefit of deterrence against the cost of suppressing reliable 
evidence.41  In applying the balancing test, the Court held that “any 
incremental deterrent effect” of the rule was outweighed by the rule’s 
substantial interference with grand jury proceedings.42  Justice Bren-
nan’s dissent classified the opinion as a “downgrading of the exclu-
sionary rule” and a “rejection . . . of the historical objective and pur-
pose of the rule.”43  Brennan pointed out the legacy of the remedy as 
an “enforcement tool” that gives both “content and meaning to the 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantees” and prevents the appearance of 
judges as accomplices to illegal government conduct.44  These two his-
torical goals of judicial integrity, Brennan argued, were being dis-
counted “to the point of extinction” by the Court.45 
For a short period following Calandra, the language of judicial in-
tegrity persisted despite the Court’s declining interest in its preserva-
tion.  In United States v. Peltier, the Court denied application of the ex-
clusionary rule while determining that the concern of judicial 
integrity was not “sufficiently weighty” to compel application of the 
remedy.46  In Brown v. Illinois, the Court again refused to suppress un-
lawfully obtained evidence, but still suggested that the consideration 
of judicial integrity was a principal concern alongside deterrence.47  
While not applying the rule, the Court in Brown held that the remedy 
should be limited to cases where “the deterrent value of the exclusio-
nary rule is most likely to be effective, and the corresponding 
mandate to preserve judicial integrity most clearly demands that the 
fruits of official misconduct be denied.”48 
 
 40 Id. at 348. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 351. 
 43 Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 360. 
 46 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975). 
 47 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975). 
 48 Id. at 611 (citations omitted); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1979) 
(“Brown’s focus on ‘the causal connection between the illegality and the confession,’ re-
flected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate the Fourth 
Amendment.  When there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the 
confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police mis-
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Yet, the language of co-equal consideration suggested by Brown 
belied the freefall of judicial integrity amidst the rise of deterrence 
and the corresponding “slow strangulation” of the exclusionary rule 
through the balancing test.49  In Stone v. Powell, the rising centrality of 
deterrence as the foremost purpose of exclusion was used as a justifi-
cation for curtailing the application of the exclusionary rule within 
an increasingly simplified balancing test.  Stone helped to substantiate 
the balancing approach articulated in Calandra by explaining that it 
was implicit within previous applications of the exclusionary rule.50  
Concerned more with the “ultimate question of guilt or innocence,” 
rather than the constitutional violation, the Court bemoaned the 
high cost of suppressing “the most probative information bearing on 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”51  Solidifying the two factors 
it would consider in its balancing test, the Court held that the “sub-
stantial societal costs” of setting the guilty free far outweighed the 
“incremental deterrent effect” provided in isolated cases.52 
Significantly, Justice Powell’s majority opinion began to redefine 
the meaning of judicial integrity altogether by suggesting that apply-
ing the exclusionary rule bears the risk of generating disrespect for 
the administration of justice by affording a “windfall” to a guilty de-
fendant.53  The majority opinion hypothesized that rigid adherence to 
judicial integrity would require exclusion even if the criminal defen-
dant consented to the inclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence, a 
hypothetical that bordered on absurdity.  Thus, the Court explained 
that “[w]hile courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserv-
ing the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force 
as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.”54 
Stone was decided on the same day as United States v. Janis, which 
bestowed another significant blow to the Fourth Amendment right by 
further redefining the meaning of judicial integrity.55  Only a foot-
note in Justice Blackmun’s opinion suggested that the “primary 
 
conduct in the future, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity 
of the courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 49 See Peltier, 422 U.S. at 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 50 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 (1976). 
 51 Id. at 490. 
 52 Id. at 494–95. 
 53 Id. at 490. 
 54 Id. at 485. 
 55 In an ironic twist of fate for one of the Founders’ most famously articulated constitutional 
rights, these latest degradations of the Fourth Amendment were announced on July 6, 
1976, the first day the Court was back in session after the nationwide celebration of the 
bicentennial of Independence Day. 
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meaning of ‘judicial integrity’” was limited to ensuring that “the 
courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitu-
tion.”56  Described in this fashion, Blackmun effectively conflated the 
concern for judicial integrity within the rationale of deterrence.  The 
Court then proceeded to use the same cost-benefit balancing test to 
restrict the exclusionary rule from application to habeas corpus 
claims. 
Justice Brennan watched helplessly as the Court continued to dis-
regard the exclusionary rule under the pretenses of a cost-benefit ba-
lancing test.  Exasperated, Brennan implored his colleagues to em-
brace their ulterior objective and simply eliminate the exclusionary 
rule altogether: 
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclusionary 
rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should forthrightly do so, and be 
done with it.  This business of slow strangulation of the rule, with no op-
portunity afforded parties most concerned to be heard, would be inde-
fensible in any circumstances.  But to attempt covertly the erosion of an 
important principle over 61 years in the making as applied in federal 
courts clearly demeans the adjudicatory function, and the institutional 
integrity of this Court.57 
The conflation of judicial integrity within the goals of deterrence 
was solidified in subsequent decisions.  In Illinois v. Gates, Justice 
White’s concurring opinion dismissed concerns of judicial integrity, 
again only within the confines of a footnote, by building upon Janis’ 
redefined “primary meaning” of judicial integrity.  Justifying the un-
ification of the goals of judicial integrity within the purpose of deter-
rence, White explained that “I am content that the interests in judi-
cial integrity run along with rather than counter to the deterrence 
concept, and that to focus upon the latter is to promote, not deni-
grate, the former.”58 
Just one year later in United States v. Leon, the Court again dis-
missed the dissent’s concerns for judicial integrity in a footnote.  In 
Leon, “for the first time, the Court refused to exclude evidence in the 
prosecution’s case in chief obtained by police who acted in ‘good 
faith.’”59  Citing Janis to suggest the inquiry into judicial integrity was 
essentially the same as that of deterrence, the Court asserted that the 
integrity of the courts is not affected by the reasonable actions of po-
lice officers.60 
 
 56 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458–459 n. 35 (1976). 
 57 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561–62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 58 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 259 n.14 (1983) (White, J., concurring). 
 59 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 470. 
 60 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984) (citing Janis, 428 U.S. 458 n.35). 
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Leon provided another significant benchmark for the Court’s use 
of the balancing test to curtail the exclusionary rule.  Justice Black-
mun’s majority opinion emphasized that the “balancing approach 
that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides 
strong support for the modification currently urged upon us.”61  The 
costs of excluding “inherently trustworthy tangible evidence,” Justice 
Blackmun explained, “have long been a source of concern.”62  Weigh-
ing “the substantial costs of exclusion” against the “marginal or non-
existent” deterrent benefits led the Court to once again rule in favor 
of admitting the evidence.63 
In the Leon dissent, Justice Brennan provided a scathing rebuke, 
claiming the “Court’s victory over the Fourth Amendment is com-
plete.”64  In a vain attempt to remind the majority of the majestic 
right of the Fourth Amendment as originally conceived by the Fra-
mers, Brennan sought to exclaim the lost purpose of the constitu-
tional right: 
The majority ignores the fundamental constitutional importance of what 
is at stake here. . . . [W]hat the Framers understood then remains true 
today—that the task of combating crime and convicting the guilty will in 
every era seem of such critical and pressing concern that we may be lured 
by the temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment to pro-
tecting individual liberty and privacy.  It was for that very reason that the 
Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that law enforcement efforts be 
permanently and unambiguously restricted in order to preserve personal 
freedoms.  In the constitutional scheme they ordained, the sometimes 
unpopular task of ensuring that the government’s enforcement efforts 
remain within the strict boundaries fixed by the Fourth Amendment was 
entrusted to the courts.65 
In sum, the rise and fall of judicial integrity as the principal justifi-
cation for the use of the exclusionary rule mirrored the rise and fall 
of the Court’s interest in applying the rule as a remedy to Fourth 
Amendment violations.  As the rationale of deterrence rose, judicial 
integrity was downplayed and then completely subsumed within the 
deterrence justification.  With deterrence increasingly recognized as 
the sole benefit of the exclusionary rule, the Court established a de-
ceptively simple balancing test skewed against applying the remedy.  
Not only did deterrence become the only benefit on one side of the 
ledger, but each application of the remedy was perceived to have only 
 
 61 Id. at 913. 
 62 Id. at 907. 
 63 Id. at 922. 
 64 Id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 929–30. 
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“marginal” or “incremental” deterrent value.  In contrast, the exclu-
sion of “highly probative evidence” was deemed a “substantial social 
cost” of applying the remedy.  As a result, the rise of the deterrence 
rationale in combination with the balancing test led to a significant 
curtailment of the exclusionary rule and ultimately a downgrading of 
the Fourth Amendment right itself. 
III.  MODERN CURTAILMENT IN HERRING AND HUDSON 
Two recent decisions have further downgraded the exclusionary 
rule to the point that its existence as a remedy to Fourth Amendment 
violations has been seriously imperiled.  In Hudson and Herring, the 
Court has laid down fresh lines of attack against the purpose and jus-
tification of the remedy while at the same time reducing the value of 
deterrence, which remains the only acknowledged benefit of the ex-
clusionary rule when utilizing the balancing test.  In applying the now 
familiar cost-benefit analysis, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Hud-
son obscured the deterrence rationale by discounting the relative 
strength of police incentives to disregard the Fourth Amendment.  
Justice Robert’s opinion in Herring further narrowed the deterrence 
benefit by noting that the opportunity for deterrence decreases in 
proportion to the level of culpability evident in the officer’s miscon-
duct.  Significantly, neither of the majority opinions discussed the 
concerns of judicial integrity at any point in their opinions, which is 
indicative of the current status and potential fate of the once majestic 
Fourth Amendment right and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule.  
Through these two decisions, the Roberts Court has expressed its val-
ue judgment that the ultimate question of guilt outweighs the need 
to protect constitutional rights.66 
A.  Hudson 
Justice Scalia’s analysis in Hudson began with what he clearly be-
lieved to be the most salient point:  the defendant’s guilt.  In Part I of 
 
 66 For recent analysis of the Roberts Court’s attack upon the exclusionary rule through Hud-
son and Herring, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts 
Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191 (2010); George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government 
Work:  The Court’s Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary 
Rule to Only the Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1 (2009); Wayne 
R. Lafave, The Smell of Herring:  A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 99 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009); David A. Moran, Waiting for 
the Other Shoe:  Hudson and the Precarious State of Mapp, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1725 (2008); Scott 
E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero:  The Suppression Hearing as Morality Play, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 255 (2010). 
60 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
his opinion, Scalia succinctly explained that “[p]olice obtained a war-
rant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of peti-
tioner Booker Hudson.  They discovered both.”67  Hudson was even-
tually convicted of a relatively minor offense—simple possession of 
less than twenty-five grams of cocaine—and sentenced to eighteen 
months of probation.68  Despite adding nothing substantive to the le-
gal analysis, Justice Scalia provided further incriminating details of 
the crime scene, explaining that police also found “large quantities” 
of drugs and a “loaded gun” on the premises.69 
After opening his opinion with the details of the defendant’s guilt, 
Scalia lamented that the case was “only” before the Court because of 
a Fourth Amendment violation regarding a failure to comply with the 
knock-and-announce rule.70  The principle that law enforcement of-
ficers must announce their presence and provide residents an oppor-
tunity to open the door is an unquestioned command of the Fourth 
Amendment and was conceded as such in Hudson.71  “Happily,” Scalia 
explained, the Court did not have to debate the murky details of 
whether a knock-and-announce violation actually occurred since the 
Fourth Amendment violation was readily admitted by the police of-
ficers involved.72 
To avoid exclusion, the Court had to deal with the fruits of the 
poisonous tree doctrine because the evidence flowed from the consti-
tutional violation.  Scalia quickly discounted this doctrine by adding a 
new element to it which determined the particular interest served by 
the constitutional guarantee.73  He asked whether the interest, in this 
case the knock-and-announce rule, would benefit from suppression.  
He indicated that the interests to be served by the knock-and-
announce rule, which include protecting property from being dam-
aged through forced entry, giving the occupant time to prepare, and 
protecting life and limb from a surprised occupant who may use self 
defense to protect his property,74 would not benefit from exclusion.  
He further discounted the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The inevit-
able discovery doctrine applies when a prosecutor establishes by a 
 
 67 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). 
 68 See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (No. 04-1360). 
 69 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.  But see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 68, at 4 (showing that 
while more drugs and a firearm were found on the premises, the police only had enough 
evidence to sustain a conviction for the simple possession charge). 
 70 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588.  
 71 Id. at 589. 
 72 Id. at 590. 
 73 Id. at 593. 
 74 Id. at 594. 
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preponderance of the evidence that unlawfully seized evidence would 
have been inevitably found through lawful police investigation.75  The 
goal of the doctrine, as explained by the Court in Nix v. Williams, is to 
assure that “the State and the accused are in the same positions they 
would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken 
place.”76  Defendant challenged the constitutionality of applying the 
inevitable discovery doctrine to the facts in Hudson, arguing that the 
inevitable discovery doctrine requires that the prosecution identify a 
source that would have produced the evidence by means indepen-
dent of the tainted source that actually produced it.77  In Hudson, the 
same officers who violated the Fourth Amendment ultimately discov-
ered the evidence. 
Rather than focusing on the parameters of the fruits doctrine, Jus-
tice Scalia focused his analysis on attacking the exclusionary remedy 
itself.  Without quoting any precedent to support the position, Scalia 
suggested that applying the rule “has always been our last resort.”78  
The exclusionary rule, he argued, had a “costly toll upon truth-
seeking,” which created a “high obstacle for those urging [its] appli-
cation.”79  In the subsequent text of his analysis, Scalia took no pains 
to conceal his disenchantment with the rule, describing the remedy 
as “severe,” “enormous,” “substantial,” “considerable,” and, on four 
separate occasions, “massive.”80 
Scalia developed his criticism of the exclusionary rule further 
within the cost-benefit balancing test, where he included some addi-
tional costs.  He began by reiterating the familiar “substantial social 
costs” of “releasing dangerous criminals into society.”81  In addition to 
this “grave adverse consequence,” Scalia added new costs to the equa-
tion.82  He warned that applying the remedy in the knock-and-
announce context would generate an administrative burden asso-
ciated with the flood of “lottery” entrants who would be looking for a 
“get-out-of-jail-free” card through suppression motions.83  Another 
 
 75 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 437–38 (1984). 
 76 Id. at 447. 
 77 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 68, at 18–20. 
 78 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.  Scalia is fairly hypocritical here as only in the next paragraph 
does he admit that the Court “did not always speak so guardedly,” referencing Whitely v. 
Warden which held that all evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution was inad-
missible.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1971)). 
 79 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 
364–65 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 80 Id. at 591, 595–96, 599. 
 81 Id. at 594–95. 
 82 Id. at 595. 
 83 Id. 
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cost of applying the remedy appeared to be the careful observance of 
the knock-and-announce rule itself.  Scalia criticized the potential ef-
fect of police officers erring on the side of caution.  Potentially wait-
ing longer than the law required could “produc[e] . . . preventable 
violence against officers in some cases, and the destruction of evi-
dence in many others.”84 
The opinion’s inclination to expand the costs associated with ap-
plying the exclusionary rule is troubling.  By the time the Court in 
Stone had applied the balancing test, the costs were supposedly “well 
known” and limited principally to a concern of interfering with the 
conviction of a criminal by suppressing “highly probative” evidence.85  
The extension of costs to include administrative burdens, police safe-
ty, and the destruction of evidence may signal a new approach to cur-
tailing the exclusionary rule.  It is plausible that these three new costs 
could be added to the balancing test in instances other than just the 
knock-and-announce context.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a case 
where cutting constitutional corners would not reduce administrative 
burdens, increase police safety, and have a greater chance of preserv-
ing whatever evidence exists. 
Balanced against these “substantial social costs” was a significantly 
reduced deterrence benefit obscured by Scalia’s analysis regarding 
the police officers’ incentive to commit the violation.  In Hudson, Sca-
lia explained that the “value of deterrence depends upon the 
strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.”86  Mapp had 
indicated that one of the principal deterrent benefits of the exclusio-
nary rule was “removing the incentive to disregard” the Fourth 
Amendment.87  Scalia attempted to distinguish the type of incentive 
emphasized in Mapp from the incentives to ignore knock-and-
announce.  For instance, violating a warrant requirement would re-
sult in securing evidence that could not be lawfully obtained, whereas 
ignoring knock-and-announce, Scalia argued, would only avoid life-
threatening resistance by occupants or prevent the destruction of 
evidence that would eventually be lawfully seized.  Since the incen-
tives associated with knock-and-announce could be bypassed with rea-
sonable suspicion of their existence, Scalia suggested that the incen-
tive to disregard the Fourth Amendment was lessened.88 
 
 84 Id.  
 85 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485, 490 (1976). 
 86 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596. 
 87 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). 
 88 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596. 
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By shifting the deterrence analysis to a discussion of the relative 
weight of incentives, Scalia added a difficult criterion to quantify in 
the incentive determination.  Concededly, suppression of evidence 
has a more direct impact upon the incentives associated with violat-
ing a warrant requirement than the incentive to knock-and-
announce.  Police may have more incentive to disregard the Fourth 
Amendment to ensure their safety, but it is arguable that the deter-
rent benefit is less in these contexts because the police would likely 
repeat a violation to ensure their safety.  When the only acknowl-
edged benefit of exclusion is deterrence, it is plausible that suppres-
sion has less of an impact in the knock-and-announce context.  Sup-
pression is better suited to instances where the police would not have 
been able to secure the evidence at all without the misconduct. 
However, the remedy of suppression also serves the important 
purposes of protecting the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right and 
avoiding the courts’ complicity in police misconduct, which would be 
accomplished in all applications of the exclusionary rule.  By ignoring 
the goals of judicial integrity, the Court allows the incentives of safety 
and the preservation of evidence to absolve the constitutional viola-
tion.  In effect, by focusing on incentives in the knock-and-announce 
context rather than on the principle of judicial integrity, Scalia shifts 
his analysis away from the constitutional rights of the defendant and 
towards the goals of law enforcement officials. 
Furthermore, while Scalia subjected the deterrence benefit to a 
flexible weight analysis, the “substantial social costs” remained im-
possibly constant.  In Hudson, the “grave adverse consequence” of ap-
plying the exclusionary rule would have been overruling the defen-
dant’s relatively minor sentence of eighteen months of probation.  
Indeed, while most critics of the exclusionary rule highlight suppres-
sion of the “bloody knife” as evidence of the substantial social costs,89 
the reality is that the exclusion of evidence in violent cases is excee-
dingly rare.90  Rather, the exclusionary rule is applied most often to 
relatively minor offenses, such as the drug possession charge in Hud-
son.91  To the majority of the Roberts Court, the exclusionary rule 
cannot even “pay its way” when the cost associated would be the over-
 
 89 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 793–94 
(1994). 
 90 See Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 119, 131 (2003) (citing Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still 
Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule:  The NIJ Study and Other Studies of 
“Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 640, 645). 
 91 See Amar, supra note 90, at 131. 
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turning of a relatively minor sentence of eighteen months proba-
tion.92  Such a biased calculation is precisely why Justice Brennan crit-
icized the balancing test as a meaningless exercise because it was 
based on “intuition, hunches, and occasional pieces of partial and of-
ten inconclusive data.”93 
The clear effect of Scalia’s balancing analysis is to further skew the 
values assessed within the cost-benefit analysis against applying the 
exclusionary rule.  Given this inclination, it is no surprise that con-
cerns regarding judicial integrity were not mentioned once in the en-
tire opinion.  In fact, reflective of the Roberts Court’s complete disin-
terest in either of the twin goals of judicial integrity, Scalia 
downplayed the relative value of the Fourth Amendment right itself, 
explaining that exclusion could “not be premised on the mere fact 
that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining the 
evidence.”94  The idea that a constitutional violation could be offhan-
dedly dismissed as a “mere fact” suggests that the Court views the 
judicial integrity goals of avoiding the sanctioning of unlawful con-
duct and giving effect to the Fourth Amendment right as trivial rela-
tive to the goals of criminal enforcement.  This is especially ironic 
when considering Justice Frankfurter’s sentiment about the Fourth 
Amendment.  “Historically,” Justice Frankfurter explained, “we are 
dealing with a provision of the Constitution which sought to guard 
against an abuse that more than any one single factor gave rise to 
American independence.”95 
The fait accompli of the exclusionary rule, however, may lie in Hud-
son’s resuscitation and expansion of Wolf’s alternative remedies.  As 
mentioned above, the Supreme Court in Wolf first suggested that re-
medies other than exclusion of evidence provided sufficient protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court looked to “remedies of 
private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the 
police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion.”96  The Court in Ir-
 
 92 The Court should also be reminded that there are significant monetary costs, as opposed 
to the esoteric costs typically assessed, associated with imprisoning criminals, estimated at 
over $20,000 per inmate.  See Expenditures/Employment, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.  (Oct. 11, 
2010) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=16  (The average annual operating 
cost per state inmate in 2001 was $22,650, or $62.05 per day).  With the largest impri-
sonment rate in the world, it is difficult to understand why setting one convicted drug of-
fender free in order to preserve our constitutional rights has such grave adverse conse-
quences. 
 93 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 942 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 94 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006). 
 95 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 96 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). 
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vine developed the concept of alternative remedies further by ex-
plaining that the Attorney General of the United States should prose-
cute the misconduct.97  However, the Justice Department took no ac-
tion against the officers in Irvine, which appears to have influenced 
Chief Justice Warren’s later stance that the exclusionary rule was a 
necessary protection of the Fourth Amendment right.98  In renewing 
the alternative remedies argument, Scalia attempted to address War-
ren’s concern by suggesting that much had changed since Mapp.99  
The continued application of the exclusionary rule, Scalia argued, 
was “forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a 
legal regime that existed almost half a century ago.”100 
Hudson first suggested that the Mapp precedent was outdated be-
cause of the development of civil remedies for constitutional viola-
tions, such as § 1983 and Bivens actions, and the great expansion of 
public-interest law firms interested in pursuing these cases.  However, 
Scalia provided no support for his faith in civil remedies as an effec-
tive replacement to the exclusionary rule and included no affirmative 
evidence in the form of citations to successful verdicts, as one might 
expect from an argument overturning a landmark precedent.  Scalia 
seemed to give the benefit of the doubt to civil remedies.  The lack of 
citations indicating that civil remedies have provided any substantial 
awards for knock-and-announce violations undermines any incentive 
to pursue them.  Nonetheless, Scalia found surprising faith in the ab-
sence of evidence, explaining that “we do not know how many claims 
have been settled.”101  Later in the same paragraph, Scalia rested his 
entire justification for the effectiveness of these remedies not on any 
damage awards, but merely on four technical victories that had al-
lowed knock-and-announce cases to proceed to trial.102  These limited 
case citations merely demonstrated instances where police officers 
had been denied qualified immunity in civil suits claiming knock-and-
announce violations.  However, not one citation was given to any 
damage award resulting from such litigation.  Again, despite the lack 
 
 97 See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (directing the Clerk of the Court to for-
ward a copy of the opinion to the Attorney General of the United States). 
 98 See Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies:  The Court that Cried “Wolf”, 77 MISS. L.J. 467, 
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of evidence, Scalia argued that “as far as we know, civil liability is an 
effective deterrent.”103 
The civil liability approach is most seriously flawed because it ig-
nores the well-documented failure of tort actions to impact the beha-
vior of government officials.  Scalia argues that the failure to abide by 
constitutional requirements “exposes municipalities to financial lia-
bility.”104  However, government officials do not internalize costs in 
the same way as private actors and cannot be expected to alter their 
behavior in the same manner.  As Daryl Levinson pointed out, 
“[b]ecause government actors respond to political, not market, in-
centives, we should not assume that government will internalize social 
costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay.”105  Indeed, 
individual police officers often have multiple layers of insulation from 
financial liability such as the affirmative defense of qualified immuni-
ty.  Police departments also often indemnify officers against personal 
liability, while at the same time offering rewards and promotions for 
the types of aggressive policing that routinely cross into Fourth 
Amendment violations.106  The political pressure to reduce crime is 
often met with an aim to boost arrest and conviction statistics to 
achieve the promises of elected officials.107  Levinson argues persua-
sively that the exclusionary remedy is a model remedy for constitu-
tional violations because it operates directly on the incentives rele-
vant to police officers and elected officials.108 
Ironically, at the same time that Justice Scalia defers the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment right to civil remedies, he has limited 
the effectiveness of civil remedies by expanding the application of 
qualified immunity.  The qualified immunity defense allows a police 
officer to avoid liability for damages unless the officer violated “clear-
ly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”109  As it was first applied, qualified im-
munity was only available if the law itself was not clearly established 
such that a reasonable person would not have been able to comply 
 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 599. 
105 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitu-
tional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000). 
106 See id. at 385 (discussing the “carrots and sticks” used by the commission to adjust the in-
centives of street-level officers). 
107 See Sean Gregory, Corey Booker Is (Still) Optimistic that He Can Save Newark, TIME, July 27, 
2009, at 36 (demonstrating how focused a mayor is on reducing crime by increasing ar-
rest statistics). 
108 See Levinson, supra note 105, at 378–79, 417. 
109 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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with its provisions.  However, in Anderson v. Creighton, Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion expanded the protection to officers who reasonably 
believed their actions were lawful despite the fact that the right vi-
olated was clearly established and understood.110 
Scalia’s expansion of qualified immunity under Anderson has 
brought considerable confusion to the defense.111  While a plaintiff 
may successfully establish that a reasonably prudent police officer 
lacked probable cause, the officer may still be provided qualified im-
munity if he reasonably believed he did have probable cause.  Thus, 
the police conduct can somehow be both “constitutionally unreason-
able” and “objectively reasonable.”112  Justice Stevens’ dissent accu-
rately described the Anderson holding as affording police “two layers 
of insulation from liability.”113 
Beyond the alleged advancement of civil remedies since Mapp, 
Scalia also touted the “increasing professionalism of police forces” as 
further justification that the exclusionary rule was no longer neces-
sary.114  This argument relied principally upon the training of police 
officers, suggesting Fourth Amendment rights are now better res-
pected, and that the deterrent effect is already provided through in-
ternal discipline and citizen review boards.  In support of his asser-
tion, Justice Scalia cited a book by Samuel Walker, which had 
applauded the Warren Court for playing a pivotal role in stimulating 
some of the police reforms that had taken shape over the course of 
the last forty years.115  However, Scalia distorted the analysis of Walk-
er’s book by suggesting that it supported the abandonement of the 
exclusionary rule in light of the adequate deterrence provided by in-
ternal police discipline.116  Following the publication of the decision, 
Samuel Walker authored an article in the Los Angeles Times clarify-
 
110  See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1987) (requiring that the unlawfulness 
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ing that his main argument was “twisted” by Scalia “to reach a conclu-
sion the exact opposite” of what he had argued.117  Rather than ar-
guing that the improvements indicated that the exclusionary rule was 
no longer required, as Scalia implied, Walker actually argued that 
such improvements indicated its continuing importance.118  Further-
more, in contrast to Scalia’s blind faith in the increased professional-
ism of police, recent empirical studies suggest the opposite—police 
misconduct has not been relegated to the days of old.119  These 
sources suggest that while there has been improvement in the “pro-
fessionalism” of police departments that has reduced the frequency 
and severity of Fourth Amendment violations, internal discipline 
measures cannot completely supplant judicial safeguards. 
B.  Herring 
The majority opinion in Herring began in much the same fashion 
as Hudson, by accepting that a constitutional violation took place 
while questioning whether the Court should provide a remedy.120  
The Fourth Amendment violation in Herring stemmed from an error 
in one of the county sheriff’s computer records, which relayed false 
information to an investigating officer that the defendant was subject 
to an outstanding warrant.121  Prior to learning of the probable cause 
error, the investigating officer arrested the defendant and, in a 
search incident to the arrest, found a small amount of methamphe-
tamine and a pistol.122  Despite the fact that the original error was 
committed by a member of the police department, the Court upheld 
the conviction based upon the investigating officer’s good faith re-
liance.123 
Leon was the first case to establish a “good faith” reliance excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule, holding that police officers were justi-
 
117 Samuel Walker, Thanks for Nothing, Nino, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M5. 
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fied in relying upon a facially valid search warrant.124  In Leon, the 
misconduct was committed by a magistrate who issued a search war-
rant with insufficient probable cause.125  The Court in Leon justified 
establishing the good faith exception by finding “strong support” 
from the balancing test, which it held was targeted exclusively at de-
terring police, rather than judicial, misconduct.126  Citing multiple 
precedents, Leon held that the effectiveness of the remedy presumes 
“that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, 
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”127  Howev-
er, the hope was not just that the police would be deterred from 
committing highly egregious Fourth Amendment violations, but also 
that the courts would seek to encourage “a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused.”128  In a footnote of the majority opi-
nion, the Court cited Professor Jerold Israel to support its under-
standing of the good faith exception, warning that this exception 
“should not encourage officers to pay less attention to what they are 
taught.”129 
The Court in Arizona v. Evans expanded the good faith exception 
to include reliance upon clerical errors committed by court em-
ployees, again establishing the inability to deter judicial, as opposed 
to law enforcement, error or misconduct.130  The facts in Herring, 
however, appeared to have fallen squarely within the type of unlawful 
behavior that was appropriately remedied by the exclusionary rule 
because the misconduct was originally committed by a police officer 
rather than a magistrate or court employee.  Chief Justice Roberts 
disputed the dissent’s assertion that the Evans holding was based 
upon this distinction.  However, it is difficult to understand what 
Evans stands for if not for the distinction between judicial and law en-
forcement personnel.  The “most important” reason why the Court in 
Evans denied application of the exclusionary rule was because “court 
clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team . . . they have no 
stake in the outcome.”131  Negating the relevance of this distinction 
appears then to diminish the “most important” justification for the 
decision in Evans. 
 
124 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 
125 Id. at 903. 
126 Id. at 913. 
127 Id. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 919–20 n.20. 
130 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995). 
131 Id. at 15. 
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Herring sidestepped the relevance of the court-police distinction 
by reassessing the value of deterrence within the balancing test just 
three years after Hudson had performed a similar sleight of hand.  
“The extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deter-
rence principles,” Roberts explained, “varies with the culpability of 
the law enforcement conduct.”132  In Leon, the opinion had suggested 
that the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule depended, at the 
very least, upon negligent conduct by a police officer.133  In Herring, 
the Roberts Court raised the bar on the type of misconduct that can 
be deterred to “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or 
in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”134  An-
nouncing a heightened iteration of the balancing test, Roberts sug-
gested that the exclusionary rule should only be triggered if police 
misconduct is:  (1) “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can mea-
ningfully deter it;” and (2) “sufficiently culpable that such deterrence 
is worth the price paid by the justice system.”135  In this regard, Herring 
introduced police culpability into the inquiry, by requiring delibe-
rate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, as opposed to isolated 
negligence, to trigger the remedy of exclusion. 
The holding in Herring managed to accomplish the undesirable 
end warned of in Leon by teaching officers that paying less attention 
to details can have beneficial effects.  Police departments now seem 
to have an incentive to be dilatory with record maintenance because 
it maintains probable cause for subsequent searches and the original 
error can be exonerated through good faith reliance.  As Justice 
Ginsburg explained in dissent, the foundational premise of negli-
gence liability in tort law is that it “creates an incentive to act with 
greater care.”136  While the majority opinion acknowledged Justice 
Ginsburg’s assessment of negligence liability, it found the substantial 
social costs of suppression too high to deter conduct related to negli-
gence.137  However, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the county she-
riff’s department had no routine practice of ensuring the accuracy of 
its database.138  Without exclusion, this sheriff’s department and oth-
ers like it had no incentive to correct negligent practices to prevent 
future Fourth Amendment violations. 
 
132 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009). 
133 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919. 
134 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. at 704. 
138 Id. at 708 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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In Herring and Hudson, the Roberts Court applied two different 
approaches to its analysis of the exclusionary rule with similar effect.  
Justice Scalia analyzed the incentives of police officers in the knock-
and-announce context to diminish the relative value of deterrence.  
Chief Justice Roberts raised the culpability requirement needed to 
apply the exclusionary rule, suggesting that the deterrence benefit 
was too minimal to be applied to negligent misconduct.  In both cas-
es, the ultimate outcome of the balancing test as applied was predict-
ably the same and the exclusionary rule was further weakened. 
IV.  AN ARGUMENT FOR THE REINSTATEMENT OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 
The Roberts Court curtailment of the exclusionary rule is signifi-
cant in two respects.  First, while the Court purports to objectively 
balance the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule, the 
new methods clearly favor keeping illegally obtained evidence admiss-
ible at trial.  Second, by simply ignoring the concerns of judicial inte-
grity altogether and instead focusing entirely upon deterrence, the 
Roberts Court has subtly pushed the original justifications for the 
rule into historical obscurity.  The steps taken, as demonstrated by 
Hudson and Herring, indicate a desire by the current Court to elimi-
nate the exclusionary rule entirely.  This desire was so apparent that 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Hudson, felt the need to write, 
“the continued operation of the exclusionary rule . . . is not in 
doubt.”139 
Often overlooked, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in California v. Min-
jares provides important foreshadowing for the Roberts Court’s aban-
donment of judicial integrity.  In a provocative dissent to a denial of 
an application to stay, Rehnquist urged the Court to reconsider 
whether “the so-called exclusionary rule should be retained.”140  In 
conjunction with this bold request, he penned a lengthy attack upon 
“the argument that the rule somehow maintains the integrity of the 
judiciary.”141  Rehnquist’s analysis of why courts should not aspire to 
the goals of judicial integrity provides insight into the mindset of con-
temporary justices interested in discarding the exclusionary rule.  
One line in particular bears notice given the unintentional irony of 
its hyperbole:  “while it is quite true that courts are not to be partici-
 
139 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
140 California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 928 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
141 Id. at 924. 
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pants in ‘dirty business,’ neither are they to be ethereal vestal virgins 
of another world.”142 
In ancient Rome, “vestal virgins” were female priests within the 
Roman religious order honored for their sacred role in society.143  
While ridiculing the concept that the judiciary should aspire to such 
a venerable status, Rehnquist’s analogy ironically carries meaningful 
symbolism.  Like the vestals of ancient Rome, judges in the United 
States are honored for a hallowed duty, which is to administer justice 
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution.  Rehnquist’s 
dismissive attitude towards the symbolic purity of the vestals is indica-
tive of the type of compromising mindset that has subjected one of 
our most fundamental constitutional principles to a corresponding 
fall from grace.  Three decades after the Minjares dissent, the goals of 
judicial integrity have fallen so far out of favor that the Court no 
longer even bothers to dismiss it as a concern.  Without the principles 
of judicial integrity serving as a guidepost to the Court’s decisions, 
the sanctity of the Fourth Amendment right and the legitimacy of the 
courts are in serious peril. 
Almost thirty years before Hudson, the Minjares dissent also fore-
shadowed Justice Scalia’s argument regarding the availability of newly 
developed civil remedies since Mapp.  Rehnquist noted that in the 
years following Mapp, the Court had resurrected § 1983 and estab-
lished Bivens actions.  “Thus,” he explained, “most of the arguments 
advanced as to why the exclusionary rule was the only practicable 
means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, whether or not they 
were true in 1949 or 1961, are no longer correct.”144 
Similar to Scalia’s subsequent analysis in Hudson, Rehnquist’s rea-
soning was remarkably conclusory.  The mere existence of alternative 
remedies seemed to assure him of their effectiveness without any evi-
dentiary support.  Rehnquist’s overconfidence likely stemmed from a 
naive overconfidence in the American jury.  He suggested that since: 
[J]uries are capable of awarding damages as between injured railroad 
employees and railroads, they surely are capable of awarding damages 
between one whose constitutional rights have been violated and either 
the agent who or the government agency that violated those rights.145 
In his desire to eliminate the exclusionary rule, Rehnquist was 
blinded to practical realities.  An injured railroad employee may be a 
 
142 Id. 
143 Rodolfo Lanciani, The House of the Vestals 136–40, in ANCIENT ROME IN THE LIGHT OF 
RECENT DISCOVERIES (Cambridge, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 12th ed. 1898). 
144 Minjares, 443 U.S. at 926 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. 
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sympathetic plaintiff in front of a jury, but a convicted criminal suing 
a police officer clearly is not.146 
By the time Rehnquist asserted that alternative remedies were suf-
ficient to enforce the Fourth Amendment, the resurgence of § 1983 
and the creation of Bivens were less than a decade old.  Given this rel-
atively short period, Rehnquist’s failure to cite any empirical data or 
case law to support his assessment is perhaps excusable.  Three dec-
ades later in Hudson, however, Justice Scalia renewed the same un-
bridled optimism regarding the effectiveness of civil remedies, again 
without supporting case citations and without acknowledging the 
high obstacles that convicted criminals face as plaintiffs.  In fact, the 
only support Scalia relied upon for his analysis came from citations to 
academic literature, the content of which was significantly distorted 
to fit his argument.147 
The Court’s deference to civil remedies diminishes its fundamen-
tal obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution.  As Justice Day 
explained in Weeks, “what remedies the defendant may have 
against . . . [police officers] we need not inquire, as the Fourth 
Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of such offi-
cials.”148  The concerns of judicial integrity are focused upon the 
Court’s duty to preserve the Fourth Amendment despite its inconve-
nience to law enforcement.  So, when Rehnquist lamented that the 
exclusionary rule requires that “the whole criminal prosecution must 
be aborted to preserve judicial integrity,” he has misdirected anger 
towards the exclusionary rule.149  It is the Fourth Amendment right, 
not the exclusionary rule, that demands the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence. 
One of the principal arguments against this notion that the 
Fourth Amendment requires the exclusionary rule is that the exclu-
sionary rule is “beyond the corners of the Fourth Amendment.”150  
This strict textualist argument questions the legitimacy of the exclu-
sionary rule because the Fourth Amendment “contains no provision 
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
 
146 L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It:  Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA 
L. REV. 669, 738–39 (1998) (explaining the difficulties of plaintiffs in bringing civil suits 
against police officers, including “unsympathetic jur[ies]”). 
147 See AVERY, RUDOVSKY & BLUM, supra note 112, at vi–vii. 
148 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
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commands.”151  The exclusionary rule is therefore dismissed as merely 
a “judicially created remedy” with limited application.152 
Yet, the history of constitutional law is riddled with rules and re-
medies found nowhere in the text of the Constitution itself, which 
remain unquestionably part and parcel of the Constitution.153  The 
bedrock of constitutional law remedies articulated by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison was a judicially created remedy that 
enabled courts to strike down unconstitutional laws despite having no 
such power expressly articulated in the Constitution.154  When Justice 
Marshall announced that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is,” he cited no particu-
lar passage in the Constitution explicitly granting such a duty.155 
It is ironic that the justices who question the legitimacy of the ex-
clusionary rule as merely a “judicially created remedy” at the same 
time emphasize the Bivens remedy as a suitable alternative.  In Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court 
held that it had the power to infer a cause of action and damage re-
medy directly from the Constitution.156  As Susan Bandes argued, the 
crucial insight of Bivens is that not only can the judicial branch fa-
shion an adequate remedy for a constitutional violation without con-
gressional action, but also that it has an affirmative duty to do so.157 
Indeed, without the latitude to provide an appropriate remedy, 
the Fourth Amendment right would have no effect.  It has been well-
established since Marbury “that every right, when withheld, must have 
a remedy.”158  This so-called “Marbury-rights” position emphasizes the 
judiciary’s critical role in vindicating constitutional rights.159  The clar-
 
151 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
10 (1995)). 
152 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
153 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) 
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judicial review.  See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 
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455, 458 (2005). 
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ity of this proposition is magnified when the cognizable right in ques-
tion is one of the pillars of the Bill of Rights and has been recognized 
as essential to our ordered liberty.  Applying a remedy to vindicate 
the substantive rights of the Fourth Amendment is a paradigmatic 
duty of the judiciary.160  As Justice Harlan explained in Bivens, “the ju-
diciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of con-
stitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amend-
ment.”161  Where such a bedrock right has been invaded, federal 
courts are obligated to use “any available remedy to make good the 
wrong done.”162 
The exclusionary rule is best suited to vindicate a Fourth Amend-
ment violation because it is the only effective remedy applied directly 
by the Court.  When the Court declines to suppress evidence ob-
tained via a Fourth Amendment violation, the simple effect is that the 
reviewing Court is compelled to excuse the misconduct.  As Justice 
Murphy pointed out in his dissent to Wolf, the court that reviews a 
conviction supported by unlawfully seized evidence has but two 
choices in front of it:  to admit or suppress the evidence.163  If we are 
to take seriously the court’s duty to protect our constitutional rights 
and preserve its sanctimonious role in the administration of justice, 
then courts must utilize the remedy of exclusion for acknowledged 
Fourth Amendment violations.  By deferring to civil remedies to re-
dress the constitutional violation, the Court legitimizes the miscon-
duct as a simple cost of law enforcement.  This position has unac-
ceptably reduced the Fourth Amendment to “no more than 
unenforceable guiding principles.”164  Only the exclusionary rule can 
serve both the interests of the citizen who seeks restitution of his 
Fourth Amendment right and the interests of the judiciary in sup-
porting the Constitution and avoiding the taint of complicity with 
misconduct.  We recognize that the exclusionary rule is not an effec-
tive remedy when no evidence is found as a result of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  Nevertheless, these situations do not impli-
cate the judiciary in the misconduct as the government is not profit-
ing from the illegality, and there is a better opportunity for a civil suit 
 
160 See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies:  The Constitution as Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1532, 1541 (1972) (“The judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this 
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161 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
162 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). 
163 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is but one 
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because the victim of the violation is not subject to a criminal prose-
cution. 
By limiting the exclusionary rule, the Court is removing the incen-
tive for plaintiffs to raise substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine on 
appeal, which only further alienates the judiciary from its obligation 
to support and define constitutional rights.165  Furthermore, the 
Court continues to add limitations to the civil rights remedies, allow-
ing courts to sidestep Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Plaintiffs in a civ-
il damage suit against a police officer must establish both that a 
Fourth Amendment right has been violated and that the officer is not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity will usually apply 
if the right was not well established.  In Saucier v. Katz, the Court held 
that the consideration of the Fourth Amendment violation would 
have to be addressed first.166  Eight years later in Pearson v. Callahan, 
however, the Court overruled Saucier, allowing courts the discretion 
to skip the violation step and turn directly to qualified immunity.167 As 
a practical effect, Pearson further limits judicial review of Fourth 
Amendment violations, which narrows the value of the constitutional 
right. 
Not only is the exclusionary rule best suited to remedy these viola-
tions, but no alternative remedy has been proven to be as effective.  
Similar to his distorted citation of Samuel Walker’s work, Justice Sca-
lia also misrepresented a citation used to support his argument about 
the effectiveness of civil remedies.  In Hudson, Justice Scalia cited the 
preface of Police Misconduct:  Law and Litigation for the premise that 
“much has changed” since Mapp, arguing that the exclusionary rule 
was no longer necessary.168  Yet, the book itself went on to lament on 
just the next page how the scope of the Fourth Amendment right as 
well as the procedural mechanisms to challenge police misconduct 
have been “dramatically narrowed.”169  In fact, the authors asserted in 
a footnote to their most recent edition that Justice Scalia’s citation to 
their analysis in support of eliminating the exclusionary rule was 
 
165 The additional value of the exclusionary rule is that it allows the Court “opportunities for 
substantive review of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”  See Robert M. Bloom, United States v. 
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“highly misleading.”170  The argument for the effectiveness of civil 
remedies, similar to that of the increasing professionalism, lacks the 
evidentiary heft required to suggest overturning the historical 
precedent of the exclusionary rule. 
In fact, the evidence actually suggests that civil remedies have 
struggled to be an effective alternative.  The Bivens remedy in particu-
lar has been gradually restricted by the Supreme Court ever since its 
inception and its effectiveness has been considerably undermined.171  
The expansion of the qualified immunity defense, most significantly 
under Anderson, has undermined plaintiffs’ opportunities to seek a 
remedy for an acknowledged Fourth Amendment violation.  Fur-
thermore, the Court’s refusal to extend Bivens liability to new claims 
or different classes of defendants reflects its disfavored status as a re-
medy.172  In addition, the hesitancy of jurors to award damages to 
convicted felons is now well documented.173  As Laurence Tribe has 
suggested, “the best that can be said of the Bivens doctrine is that it is 
on life support with little prospect of recovery.”174 
Admittedly, applying the exclusionary rule is no easy task.  As Jus-
tice Stewart explained, “[a]pplying principles that do justice in the 
greater sense while working terrible misfortunes in particular cases is 
one of the most difficult tasks that any judge must face.”175  When evi-
dence has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is 
not possible to both convict the guilty and preserve the constitutional 
right at the same time.  Each time the Court faces such a decision, it 
is compelled to make a difficult choice.  As Justice Holmes explained, 
“[w]e have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some 
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ig-
noble part.”176  Justice Holmes’ famous quote emphasized the lesser 
of two evils, but the choice is equally clear from the standpoint of the 
greater of two goods.  The greater good accomplished by protecting 
one of the key Bill of Rights greatly surpasses the incremental benefit 
of sustaining the conviction of one guilty criminal, especially when 
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78 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
considering the fact that the vast majority of exclusionary rule appli-
cations are directed at non-violent offenses.  Viewed as a greater good 
or a lesser evil, the choice appears clear.  In applying the exclusionary 
rule to violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Court will not only 
return the judiciary to its sanctimonious role, but will also return the 
Fourth Amendment right to its “majestic” position as one of the most 
fundamental rights of a free society. 
There is still hope that these twin pillars of judicial integrity will 
be preserved despite a majority of the Supreme Court’s apparent in-
difference.  Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Herring preserved the notion 
within the legal discourse of the Supreme Court, and this notion has 
been accepted by the three additional justices dissenting in Herring.  
It should also be noted, as previously mentioned, that Justice Kenne-
dy felt compelled to point out in Hudson that the viability of the ex-
clusionary rule was not in question.177 
In addition, a variety of state courts have accepted the notion that 
judicial integrity is a fundamental rationale of their exclusionary rule 
analyses.  The Massachusetts Appellate Court maintained that deter-
rence is only one aim of the exclusionary rule and that “so too is a de-
sire to avoid judicial participation in the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.”178  In fact, judicial in-
tegrity has been listed as a rationale for the exclusionary rule, along 
with deterrence, in a number of states.179  The Hawaii Supreme Court 
emphasized one of Ginsburg’s pillars of judicial integrity:  “[t]he 
‘judicial integrity’ purpose of the exclusionary rule is essentially that 
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the courts should not place their imprimatur on evidence that was il-
legally obtained by allowing it to be admitted into evidence in a crim-
inal prosecution.”180  The Kentucky Appellate Court in State v. Lee 
even quoted Mapp v. Ohio:  “we are also mindful that to maintain 
judicial integrity ‘the criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law 
that sets him free.’”181  As such, the rationale of judicial integrity lives 
on in state courts. 
Our neighbor to the north has embraced judicial integrity as the 
primary rationale for the exclusion of evidence.  Unlike the United 
States, the exclusionary rule is not merely a judge-created doctrine 
but it is embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which grants courts discretion to exclude evidence procured in viola-
tion of a Charter right if “admission . . . would bring the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute.”182  In a recent interpretation of this 
provision, the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasized that the poten-
tial impact on the “administration of justice” must be measured sys-
tematically and in the long term and that police deterrence is only a 
positive side-effect and not a primary consideration: 
Viewed broadly, the term “administration of justice” embraces maintain-
ing the rule of law and upholding Charter rights in the justice system as a 
whole.  The phrase “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” 
must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the integrity 
of, and public confidence in, the justice system. . . . [Section] 24(2) does 
not focus on immediate reaction to the individual case.  Rather, it looks 
to whether the overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long 
term, will be adversely affected by admission of evidence. . . . Section 
24(2)’s focus is . . . prospective. . . . Section 24(2) starts from that propo-
sition and seeks to ensure that evidence obtained through that breach 
does not do further damage to the repute of the justice sys-
tem. . . . Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing 
compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. 183 
Therefore, the substantial burden to establish “incremental” deter-
rence does not exist in Canada, as it does in the United States.  Be-
cause the focus is on the prevention of bringing the “administration 
of justice into disrepute,” the exclusionary rule analysis centers on the 
seriousness of the breach, rather than the seriousness of the of-
fense.184  For instance, in R. v. Harrison, the excessive amount (70 
pounds) of cocaine did not factor into the decision to exclude that 
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cocaine as evidence.  Instead, the blatant disregard of the defendant’s 
rights outweighed any interest society may have in convicting the de-
fendant.185  This case illustrates how, by virtue of considering judicial 
integrity, the operation of the Canadian balancing test offers a much 
more expansive view of balancing than the limited focus on deter-
rence utilized by the United States Supreme Court. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Ginsburg’s vision of a more majestic conception of the 
Fourth Amendment right is critical in light of the Court’s renewed 
interest in abandoning the exclusionary rule.  Joined by three other 
justices, Justice Ginsburg reminds the Court that the exclusionary 
rule serves the important purpose of preserving judicial integrity and 
remains the only effective remedy to redress Fourth Amendment vi-
olations.  Thus, while the majority of the Supreme Court is willing to 
let the relevance of judicial integrity fade into historical obscurity, it 
appears that this rationale may remain a powerful force in constitu-
tional law and help retain the exclusionary rule as a necessary adjunct 
to the Fourth Amendment right.186 
 
 
185 R. v. Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, para. 1–2 (Can.). 
186 See Carol S. Steiker, Brandeis in Olmstead:  “Our Government is the Potent, the Omnipresent 
Teacher,” 79 MISS. L.J. 149, 175 (2009). 
